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Abstract 
Limited liability is a human invention which has facilitated enormous economic growth around the 
world, particularly since the time of its general application in advanced countries during the nineteenth 
century. The individual legal identity of companies, coupled with the limited liability of their owners, 
has provided protection for investors from the risks associated with their investments. It has thus 
contributed to increase the sources of capital available to finance projects which might otherwise have 
been considered unviable. However, the legal protection offered to investors has negative 
consequences for other participants in economies. Speculation in stock markets often damages society. 
It is very important to study the drawbacks of limited liability and to suggest modifications to achieve 
a more stable, less volatile, economic growth in the world. Although this article goes to some lengths 
to recognise the work of authors who emphasise the positive historical economic contribution of 
limited liability, its main objective is to provoke a reflection around texts which point out the 
drawbacks and propose solutions. 
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Introduction 
This article will analyse a variety of academic texts which describe a series of drawbacks 
associated with the historical development of the limited liability model of business 
ownership and management. It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the issues 




The ideas expressed will be compared with the extensive bibliography which defends 
contemporary financial institutions by studying the benefits they have provided throughout 
their history. To understand such theses, it will be important to examine the historical origins 
of limited liability and its development during recent centuries and to consider authors who 
express confidence in the future evolution of financial innovations.  
We will then proceed to evaluate studies which suggest proposals to improve the operation of 
limited liability, some of which have been implemented at certain times during the 
contemporary period of history. They aim at correcting the imbalance created by protecting 
shareholders at the expense of other participants in economic activities.  
Drawbacks of the Limited Liability Business Model 
The limited liability company is a legal structure by which the capital ownership of a business 
is divided into shares. Shareholders do not respond personally for business debts: their 
liabilities are limited to the amount of their investment. The model has deep historical roots 
and is a fully consolidated in day-to-day commerce practically everywhere. However, during 
                                                          
1
 This article is based on a dissertation written in the summer of 2014 which formed part of the author’s studies 
towards a Masters in Economic History in the Economic History Department of the University of Barcelona. The 
author wishes to acknowledge the advice provided by the Department, with special thanks to Yolanda Blasco 
Martel who supervised the original dissertation. Thanks are also due to the anonymous JESB reviewers for their 
appraisal and for their improvement suggestions. 
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the history of its application the advantages and disadvantages of limited liability have been 
subject to vigorous debate in universities and political circles (Kindleberger 1988, Shiller 
2004). 
 The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 generalised the creation of limited liability 
companies in England. In the parliamentary debate prior to voting Lord Curriehill
2
 predicted 
three major problems. Firstly, creditors would be subject to fraud either through their 
ignorance of the limited liability status of their debtors or through an excessive confidence in 
company accounts – often unreliable. Secondly, speculation would be increased because of 
the transfer of investor risk to company creditors and the consequent seduction of gullible 
investors expecting easy profits. Thirdly, for Lord Curriehill companies enjoying limited 
liability would benefit from a protection which would be unavailable to traditional businesses, 
thus creating unfair competition (Bryer 1997: 47). 
The doubts which surrounded limited liability in England in 1856 were a reflection of the 
debate which had taken place forty-five years earlier in the United States prior to the approval 
of the 1811 New York Act which generalised the institution of the limited liability company 
in certain industrial sectors in North America. Robert J. Shiller (Shiller 2004: 271) refers to 
the work of the historian David Moss who documented an impressive number of arguments 
against the law that were debated by the American legislators (Moss 2004). Many political 
representatives considered that the protection offered to shareholders from the consequences 
of business losses would provide them with an incentive to carry out excessively risky 
operations. Under the new law shareholders would not have to pay all the losses incurred if 
                                                          
2
 Lord Curriehill (1794-1868): a prominent Scottish judge whose contribution to the debate is documented in 
parlamentary records. 
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the results turned out to be negative, but would receive all the profits if the businesses were 
successful. 
For many present-day authors, speculative investment in financial markets constitutes the 
principal drawback in relation to the legal structure of the limited company. Shareholders feel 
protected (due to the limitation of their liabilities) from the risks associated with the activities 
of the businesses in which they hold stock, and so they invest with a lower degree of caution 
than would be appropriate in other circumstances. In fact, speculation was worrying 
commentators as far back as the 18
th
 century, well before the general spread of limited 
liability companies, when they could only be created by special statute. Charles P. 
Kindleberger explains that many investors would sell their shares before paying for them in 
full and would show little interest in the progress of business projects (Kindleberger 1988: 
267). Speculation forced the British government to severely restrict share operations and the 
Bubble Act of 1719-1720 practically prohibited the creation of new limited liability 
companies during a long period up to its repeal in 1825 (Galbraith 1991: 58-63). 
Although a majority of economists expresses strong reservations about protectionist 
commercial policies (Krugman, Wells and Graddy 2011) few question protectionism as it 
applies to shareholders in limited companies. But the limited liability company is a legal 
creation that does not exist in any natural form, so it can and should be subject to review and 
modification in order to better satisfy the necessities of the human community. For this 
reason, the academic study of the corporate form is relevant for the future development of 
society (Hiller 2013: 287). 
An important characteristic of limited liability is that the obligations of management to 
maximise shareholder profits are legal impositions. They do not stem from voluntary 
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agreements, as might be the case with their principle obligations towards employees, 
customers or suppliers. Corporate laws impose on the directors a duty to direct their efforts 
towards the achievement of shareholder profit (Mayer 2013: 28-32). The consequences of 
these legal obligations can be very profound in relation to the personal ethics of the managers 
and their sense of social responsibility. A series of experiments has been carried out which 
demonstrates that the great majority of top executives in North American companies place 
profits before moral beliefs when confronted with opportunities to work for the general 
benefit of society. Even more interesting is that the same experiments have demonstrated 
quite different results in the case of partners in businesses which are not limited liability 
companies (Rose 2007: 323-330). The implication is that whatever effort that might be 
directed towards educating company managers in professional ethics is practically useless: 
their decisions will always be determined by their legal obligations to maximise profits. 
There are many specific cases that can be studied in order to understand who might be the 
victims of this exclusive obligation to maximise benefits for shareholders whilst ignoring the 
interests of other business participants. Here, due to the need for brevity, we will consider just 
one example. The history of the British confectionery group Cadbury, and the struggle to 
control the company up to the time of its acquisition by Kraft in 2010, provides an illustration 
of the way corporations have been managed under the limited liability model (Bell 2013, 
Mayer 2013, Funding Universe 2014, Grace’s Guide 2014). Throughout the 19
th
 century and a 
large part of the 20
th
 century the Cadbury family involved all the stakeholders
3
 in the running 
of the business. The executives attended to the needs of the employees and demonstrated a 
                                                          
3
 Although the term stakeholder was not invented until the 1960’s its anachronic application in this text is 
justified because it defines those participants in limited liability companies who are not shareholders. Such 
stakeholders can include employees, customers, suppliers, neighbours, regulators, governmental authorities, 
society in general and the environment.  
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concern for the contribution of the business to the general well-being of society. However, 
important changes took place in the nineteen sixties when the company became an acquisition 
target for various shareholder groups interested in short-term gain. Cadbury was perceived to 
be in play in financial markets, subject to the attention of venture capitalists and public 
company takeover specialists
4
. It became an example of imbalances in the management of 
limited liability companies. The interests of one particular group (shareholders, beneficiaries 
of the legal protection which limited their liabilities) took priority over the rest, and the long-
term financial performances of the businesses concerned were jeopardised. 
In 2009 in the USA Kraft Foods Inc. launched a takeover bid for Cadbury plc. It met with 
fierce opposition from three groups: British public opinion because of the loss of a brand 
identified with the national culture; the main unions which feared a wave of redundancies as a 
result of the acquisition; and a significant number of politicians who were worried about the 
possible transfer of activities to other countries and a consequent avoidance of UK tax. 
Protests were also heard relating to the multi-million pound fees charged by the banks 
involved in the deal. Despite all these objections, however, Kraft Foods Inc. was able to 
complete the acquisition in February 2010 because it met with shareholder approval. The 
acquisition price was £11,5bn (approximately €14,5bn), financed by borrowings of £7,0bn 
(approximately €9,0bn). Paradoxically, the main lender turned out to be RBS, a bank 
controlled by the British government following the rescue of the banking sector during the 
financial crisis in 2008. 
                                                          
4
 Public company takeovers occur when a person (normally a limited company) makes an offer to buy the shares 
of a stock-market quoted company with the objective of achieving a significant participation in its capital and 
corresponding voting rights. In many cases takeovers constitute a threat to the employment of the directors of the 
target company who try to persuade shareholders to reject the offer. It should be noted that the term “public 
company” in the United Kingdom refers to the company’s shares being held and traded by the general public and 
does not generally signify any kind of state ownership. 
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Later in 2010 Kraft, despite earlier promises not to make lay-offs, began to announce the 
closure of English factories and the transfer of production to a series of countries with cheaper 
labour costs such as Poland. Furthermore, fiscal matters began to be dealt with in Switzerland 
as a means of saving tax, again in spite of promises to the contrary made during the 
acquisition process. The British government ordered an investigation. The managing director 
of Kraft, Irene Rosenfeld, was asked to appear on various occasions to answer questions from 
members of the parliamentary commission charged with preparing the corresponding report. 
However, Rosenfeld rejected all the requests and did not appear before the commission at any 
time. In 2011, following a declaration of disappointing results, the directors of Kraft decided 
to separate the confectionery business from the remainder of their interests. Since then 
Cadbury has formed part of a new company, Mondelez International Inc. 
The importance of the Cadbury example is that it is not an isolated case in an unusual 
business sector. Many other companies in very traditional areas of business have experienced 
a similar evolution, a fact which would seem to contradict the widely accepted notion, 
supported by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (Easterbrook and Fischel 1985: 95-
96), of takeovers being healthy mechanisms which always bring benefits.   
The Defence of Limited Liability Based on History 
There are a number of prestigious authors who consider that modern financial markets, based 
on limited liability, provide the basis of economic growth in the world.  For Robert J. Shiller 
(Shiller 2004: 267-273 and 2012: 87-94) the essential aspects of limited liability became 
generally applicable to financial markets in the 19
th
 century. The 1811 New York Act not only 
allowed any business within permitted sectors (complying with certain prerequisites) to adopt 
company status, but also took the radically innovative step of stipulating that the liabilities of 
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all their shareholders would be strictly limited. Before the passing of this Act, limited liability 
companies were practically always created as a result of privileges granted by government, 
and their general spread was impossible. Furthermore, before the changes creditors of 
companies in difficulties could impound the personal assets of shareholders – including the 
assets of small shareholders – until outstanding debts were paid. 
The New York experiment was successful and with the passing of time all other states passed 
their limited liability Acts. California was the last to do so in 1931. The 1811 Act, which 
enabled New York to become a financial world leader, inspired corporate legislation in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France and eventually almost all developed countries. Limited 
liability allowed investors to acquire large diversified portfolios of shares, previously 
unadvisable given that the failure of a single investment could result in financial ruin. It is 
interesting to observe that the inventors of limited liability legislation did not envisage 
diversification of portfolios, but one thing led to another and such diversification became a 
fundamental aspect of limited liability. 
Shiller concludes that the history of humanity is a succession of financial inventions which 
have improved our lives (Shiller 2004: 281). Innovations which appear to be loaded with 
complexities and problems can turn into standard tools of risk management when 
professionals learn how to use them properly. So the invention of limited liability and its 
derivatives has and will have positive effects for everyone. Even after the financial crisis of 
2008 Shiller expresses great confidence in the evolution of financial markets, considers the 
stock market to be a fantastic invention, distances the legal structure of companies from 
speculation stating that thanks to human weaknesses we are always subject to bubbles and 
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bursts, and affirms that the enormous growth in the securitisation of mortgages in the United 
States arose …. because businesses tried to please regulators (Shiller 2012: 17, 88, 102). 
Max Gillman and Tim Eade (Gillman and Eade 1995: 20) explain that the evolution of the 
corporate form was related to changes in trading practices during the industrial revolution, 
characterised by a greater degree of specialisation. The expansion of trade created a need for 
organisational improvements to reduce transaction costs
5
. Just as manufactured products and 
workers were becoming more and more specialised, so the corporate structure needed to 
evolve. The incorporation of businesses and the limitation of the financial liabilities of 
shareholders appear to be products of this demand for specialisation in the corporate form. 
In this respect the observations of the great industrial historian Alfred D. Chandler Jr. 
(Chandler 1990: 9-10) are also relevant. For this author the advantages of limited liability are 
evident. In the USA the spread of the railway and telegraph networks demanded the 
appearance of a new type of business. The massive investments necessary for their 
construction brought about a separation between ownership and management. Companies, 
now much larger, came to be managed by teams of professionals. Shareholders, now 
protected from possible ruin in the case of business failure, could afford to distance 
themselves from the day-to-day affairs of the businesses they owned.  
Other authors emphasise the social benefits of the limited liability company. For R. A. Bryer 
(Bryer 1997: 38-39) commentators who favoured limited liability in the first half of the 19
th
 
century had a social vision of capital which anticipated Marx’s criticism of the individualistic 
thought proposed by Adam Smith. For these commentators unlimited liability implied a 
concentration of capital in the hands of an elite who controlled the management of their 
                                                          
5
 In economics a transaction cost is one which is incurred in order to carry out an economic interchange. Such a 
cost can be reduced by organizational improvements as well as through collaboration between businesses or 
between departments within the same business.  
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businesses (they assumed all the risk and so felt compelled to exercise full operational 
control). Furthermore, for the capital to be social it was not only profits that had to be shared 
equally between investors but also losses – which was achieved by limiting such losses to the 
amount of capital invested. 
David McBride (McBride 2011: 3) explains that the legal corporate structure had a number of 
advantages over other forms, the most important being the doctrine relating to limited 
liability.
6
 Since the construction of railway networks in the middle of the 19
th
 century large 
capital investments became essential for progress. The creation of common funds for 
numerous investors became an important means of raising capital, but investors were not 
disposed to place money in businesses which they did not control if they were to expose 
themselves to an unlimited liability for debts. In this respect the limitation of their liabilities 
was critical not only for the development of the corporation but also for the national economy 
in general. Other advantages of the corporate form included the use of modern management 
techniques which were developed during the late 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 centuries by 
professional managers who were not owners, as well as perpetual existence (considered 
below) and the ability to carry out mergers.  
For Margaret Blair (Blair 2004: 3) one of the great advantages of incorporation
7
 for North 
American businesses in the 19
th
 century was related to the difficulties in the financing of 
complex projects which depended on a series of inputs during a long period of time and where 
outputs were not easily divisible in portions or parts attributable to the inputs. A business 
controlled by partners had the major disadvantage that any one of them could withdraw at any 
                                                          
6
 The word liability in English implies a legal obligation to make a payment. In some languages it has the same 
translation as responsibility although in English it does not have the moral connotation of such a term. 
7
 Incorporation: the concession of an individual legal status to a business which thereby becomes a company or 
corporation. The liabilities associated with the business are passed to the company and no longer pertain to the 
shareholders as individuals. 
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time, taking with him his part of the assets and so putting an end to the productive activity and 
dis-incentivising long-term projects. The invention of the joint stock company
8
 in the 17
th
 
century provided an important tool to overcome this problem. Members could no longer 
withdraw their part of the assets but came to depend on the decisions of the directors 
regarding dividends. In this way companies were able to maintain the resources dedicated to 
their activities during a long-term horizon. Nevertheless, on the death of a shareholder it was 
possible for his heirs to withdraw the investment, a fact which demonstrated the still 
imperfect separation of ownership from management. This defect would take time to correct, 
with the relevant legislation not being implemented in some North American states until the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. It decreed that, once committed, any capital invested in a 
corporation by its investors could not be withdrawn. 
In summary, Blair is an enthusiast of the commitment of capital offered by the institution of 
limited liability companies. Their nature is perpetual and they are capable of contributing to 
the development of long-term projects independently of the time horizons of the owners of the 
shares at any one moment. The author notes the case of the American sewing-machine 
business I. M. Singer & Co., originally owned by two partners: Isaac Merritt Singer and 
Edward Clark. The time came when Singer left the management in the hands of Clark and 
began to enjoy his wealth in the company of a succession of women with whom he had 
various children. Clark feared the break-up of the business on the possible death of his partner 
due to withdrawals by his many heirs. Finally, in August 1863 he managed to convince him 
by incorporating the business as the Singer Manufacturing Company and so separating the 
                                                          
8
 A Joint Stock Company is a business owned by shareholders. Its capital is divided into portions (or shares) such 
that ownership is proportional to the number of shares held. Today most joint stock companies are incorporated 
and the liability of shareholders is limited to the amount of their investment. However, historically these last two 
characteristics were not always found in joint stock companies. 
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affairs of the owners from the management of the business and thus avoiding its possible 
closure on the death of his old partner (Blair 2004: 15-19). 
Andrew A. Schwartz (Schwartz 2012: 765-830) also discusses the perpetual nature of the 
limited liability company. He attributes it the merit of ensuring a long-term future for the 
corporation which acts as an immortal investor. It allows for a sustainable growth in 
economies and implies a concern for the future which incentivises activities which are 
socially beneficial for the whole community. Immortal investors by definition expect less 
short-term profit than mortal ones, thereby creating a longer-lasting and more sustainable 
wealth. It is an extremely optimistic vision of the corporation. Schwartz considers that 
management short-termism can be solved by better education and by the use of techniques to 
promote a historical and long-lasting identity in the business (images, hymns, logos….). The 
same author recognises that many perpetual companies have human owners (and so can 
hardly be considered to be immortal in relation to their objectives), but points out that there 
are also a large number whose owners are other companies which do have a perpetual nature. 
Many of these questions relating to the impact of limited liability on business management are 
to be found in a practical case studied by Graeme Acheson and John D. Turner (Acheson and 
Turner 2006: 320-346). The basis of their work is data discovered in the archives of the Ulster 
Bank in Ireland which pertain to years both before and after the conversion of the bank to a 
limited liability company.  
The two authors explain that during the major part of the 19
th
 century banks in Great Britain 
were dominated by unlimited liability companies. However, as a consequence of the failure of 
the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 practically all banks decided to limit the liabilities of their 
shareholders. We therefore have a natural experiment by which it is possible to demonstrate 
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the impact of the change in relation to ownership, control and management in the banking 
sector. Acheson and Turner demonstrate that limited liability for the banks in question 
strengthened their ability to access capital, increasing the number of shares and their 
dispersion. Shareholdings were no longer confined to the rich, and the number of shares in the 
hands of directors decreased - implying that the role of director came to correspond to 
professional managers rather than shareholders (Acheson and Turner 2006: 329-334). 
Another author who explains the history of the limited liability company from a positive 
perspective with respect to its contribution to economic growth is Eduardo Andrades Rivas 
(Andrades Rivas 2011: 401-444). He investigated the very beginnings of the institution. His 
most interesting conclusion is that the shareholder company is not exclusive to capitalism but 
pertains to every advancing society. Quoting the Italian lawyer Lorenzo Mossa he sustains 
that it cannot be considered as the culminating achievement of capitalism and of liberalism 
which have favoured its existence and have coincided in time: It is the creation of every 
society and as such its destiny is to accompany society and, at certain times, to have its own 
destiny. The [socialist] revolution of this [20
th
] century, which planned its destruction, has 
ended up perfecting it instead of annihilating it (Mossa 1951). 
For Andrades Rivas the origin of the limited liability company is to be found in the United 
Provinces of the Netherlands during the time of the war with Felipe II (king of Spain between 
1556 and 1598). The conflict provoked the creation of a society or company which, 
benefitting from legal privilege and financed by hundreds of small investors, was able to 
confront the challenges of international trade. Later on, after its foundation in 1621, the Dutch 
East India Company would respond to this trading impulse. The liability of the investors 
would be limited to the price of the shares subscribed.  
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The experience in France came later than in the Netherlands. The French East India Company 
was founded by the minister Colbert in 1664, and in 1717 the New Indies Company was set 
up. New instruments were created such as bearer shares, limited liability and the 
establishment of Boards of Shareholders. After the traumas of the French Revolution limited 
liability companies would again be authorised in 1796; and finally the Trade Regulations of 
1807 would be applied to companies, thereby bringing them under State supervision.  
A very interesting aspect of Andrades Rivas’s work is that which relates to his observations 
surrounding the origins of the limited liability company in Spain. It appears that they were 
unrelated to events in the Netherlands and in France. This diversity of roots of the institution 
in different European countries backs up the author’s hypothesis that sees the limited liability 
company as an invention common to all advancing societies, independent of capitalism. 
So what has happened since those early days when the limited liability company offered such 
effective solutions in the development of commerce?  For David McBride (McBride 2011: 
18) it was created and was successful in a world which was simpler than it is today. The 
increase in the size and complexity of corporations and of financial markets has led to new 
problems with respect to the most efficient and fair organisation, combined with difficulties 
associated with the maintenance of the confidence necessary for its effective operation in 
society and in markets, and with the facilitation of a healthy flow of information and 
communication between interested parties. It may be that modern challenges demand an 
experimentation with new organisational structures in order to determine, by a process of trial 
and error, which are the ones that best overcome the difficulties. 
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In his conclusions McBride, rather than question the limited liability model, considers it to be 
an early step in economic evolution. Corporate law should therefore be flexible in order to 
promote new social technologies and adapt itself to change. For example, the law should be 
sufficiently elastic to be able to tackle the perennial conflicts that exist between the interests 
of shareholders and other participants in business activities such as suppliers, customers and 
workers (McBride 2011: 12-14). 
However, what for McBride are gentle movements in an evolutionary process, for others 
respond to moments of crisis. An editorial about financial crises published in the weekly 
magazine The Economist (12-18 April 2014: 47) states that institutions [and instruments] that 
enhance people’s economic lives such as central banks, deposit insurance and stock exchanges, are 
not the products of careful design in calm times, but are cobbled together at the bottom of financial 
cliffs. Often what starts out as a post-crisis sticking plaster becomes a permanent feature of the 
system. In the same way for Nicholas Kyriazis and Theodore Metaxas (Kyriazis and Metaxas 
2011: 364) decisions which change history are taken in response to shocks and lead to new 
paths. They provoke the development of new institutions and organisations which demand 
significant investments linked to benefits for society in general. During the periods that 
follow, these investments become sunk costs which impede a return to the previous path. The 
authors explain that the shock which caused the invention of the Joint Stock Company in the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands in the 17
th
 century was the rebellion against Spanish 
domination. The creation of the Dutch East Indian Company permitted the capture of a 
lucrative spice trade from the enemies. In this way they conclude that the shock of the 
rebellion broke the evolutionary economic process. The implication is that it is very difficult 
to correct harmful deviations in the direction of economic evolution without the emergence of 
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new shocks. From this perspective McBride’s notion of the limited liability company forming 
part of a steady evolutionary process is not so clear. 
So how can the limited liability model be improved without waiting for some kind of major 
crisis or shock to forcibly change our economic systems? The next section looks at some 
ideas. 
Possible Solutions to Improve the Limited Liability Model 
Multiple liability 
To look for a first possible solution to improve the limited liability model we can refer to 
studies carried out by Richard S. Grossman (Grossman 2001: 143-159 and 2007: 59-80) into 
the concept of multiple liability as it existed between the end of the Civil War in 1865 and the 
nineteen thirties’ Great Depression in the United States banking sector. The idea was to make 
shareholders liable up to a limit of a multiple (normally two, hence the denomination double 
liability) of the amount of their investment. Expressed another way, under double liability 
shareholders in failed banks could lose, in addition to the initial acquisition value of their 
shares, a further amount equal to the nominal value. Grossman concludes that double liability 
reduced the risks taken on by banks, although it did not necessarily guarantee stability in 
times of crisis. 
The identification of reductions in the risks taken on by businesses is important for this article 
because it implies a greater concern on the part of shareholders about the consequences of 
business activities. By sharing losses with other business participants, they have an incentive 
to demand a style of management more in line with the interests of everyone involved. 
Furthermore, double or multiple liability is interesting because it offers an alternative to more 
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regulations in the banking sector. It foments self-regulation imposed by shareholders and acts 
as a market-driven mechanism to reduce banking risk.  
The practice of multiple liability terminated in the nineteen thirties, principally for three 
reasons. Firstly, the financial ruin of many shareholders who had had no influence in the 
management of failed banks generated political pressure to change the law. Secondly, the 
wave of banking failures in the nineteen thirties was believed to imply that the law had not 
fulfilled its objectives. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, the imposition of federal 
insurance for deposits was held to indicate that multiple liability was no longer relevant. Early 
evaluations by contemporary authors concluded that the decision of the majority of states to 
abandon multiple liability in the nineteen thirties constituted irrefutable proof of its 
inefficiency (Marquis and Smith 1937: 502). However, more recent quantitative studies, like 
Grossman’s, have thrown a more favourable light on the experience. 
In order to ascertain whether multiple liability affected risk-taking in banks Grossman 
examined their balance sheets and looked at data surrounding bank failures as a means of 
evaluating management policy. He recognised that the use of such data had its limitations as a 
way of measuring operational risk but other options were just too complicated.  
Grossman concludes that it is possible that shareholder liability laws did play a role in the 
assumption of risk by managers, and that multiple liability did reduce banking risk in the late 
19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century. The effects could be seen in the rate of failures, capital / 
asset ratios, and liquidity rates of banks in states where multiple liability was adopted. It is 
true that these state banks were unable to avoid the effects of the crisis during the nineteen 
thirties, but such effects have generally been evaluated using data on liquidations and 
Grossman suggests that in many cases prudent bankers would be the first to liquidate their 
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operations - in order to prevent future losses. Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller (Macey 
and Miller 1992: 53-54) have no doubts about this. They consider that the early closure of 
banks facing difficulties – before getting to the stage where liabilities exceeded assets – 
ensured that all creditors were paid. Even in the most difficult period between 1930 and 1934 
depositors’ losses in national banks (with multiple liability) amounted to no more than 
seventy-seven cents per thousand dollars. For these two authors history has demonstrated that 
in the USA a mistake was made when multiple liability was abandoned in favour of a deposit 
insurance scheme administered by the government.   
Corporate Social Responsibility 
The idea of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) represents a continual commitment on the 
part of an organisation to behave ethically and contribute to economic development whilst 
endeavouring to improve the quality of life of its employees (and their families), local 
communities and society in general (Lindgreen and Swaen 2010: 3, Watts and Holme 1999). 
It could be said that its application constitutes a recognition of the need to compensate 
imbalances created by the legal form of limited liability which obliges business managers to 
work exclusively for the benefit of shareholders.  
For Richard Marens (Marens 2012: 64-76) the earliest ideas relating to CSR arose in the 
United States in the nineteen twenties as a consequence of the independence achieved by 
corporate executives with respect to worker demands. Once the development of union 
organisations had been stunted (with the help of government), during the second and third 
decades of the 20
th
 century an important segment of Corporate America tried to establish 
itself as a group of responsible employers and so consolidate the peace by nurturing satisfied 
and productive workforces and an understanding public. Many executives considered 
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themselves to be intermediaries whose objective was to balance the interests of the different 
classes of person associated with their businesses (Marens 2012: 75). Although the term 
stakeholder wasn’t invented until the nineteen sixties, it seems clear that the concept was 
already being developed. In 1917 Henry Ford explained that the objectives of his company 
were for everyone to be able to contribute, to create employment, to manufacture a car which 
people wanted….and by the way to make a profit. He introduced the notion of business as a 
service to society (Lee 2008: 54).  
During the Great Depression and the interventionist policies of the New Deal, corporations 
paid less attention to their social obligations. However, once the Second World War was over, 
CSR began to grow. A book published in 1953 by Howard Bowen, Social Responsibilities of 
the Businessman (Bowen 1953), described the obligations of businesses with respect to the 
social consequences of their activities. It was a work which provided the necessary 
intellectual backing to reflect on the rapid social change which would take place in the 
following decades. During the nineteen fifties and sixties numerous new laws were enacted to 
regulate business and to protect employees and consumers. Furthermore, the birth of a large 
number of consumer protest movements led to declarations by companies about CSR and to 
hundreds of books and articles analysing the issue (Lee 2008: 56-58). Nevertheless, 
publications critical of CSR also began to appear. In 1962 Milton Friedman (Friedman 1962) 
argued that the only social responsibility of a corporation was to make money for its 
shareholders and considered CSR to be a subversive doctrine. Ned Dobos (Dobos 2011: 273) 
explains that for libertarians being a shareholder was not a manner of avoiding natural 
positive duties (benefitting from the participation in a company without assuming the 
associated responsibilities), because such duties did not exist.   
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In the nineteen seventies new justifications of CSR appeared based on the benefits it could 
provide for shareholders. In 1970 H. C. Wallich and J. J. McGowan (Wallich and McGowan 
1970) argued that the long-term interests of shareholders were coherent with a correct social 
attitude on the part of business. Their ideas were further developed in the nineteen eighties 
following A. B. Carroll’s model of Social Corporate Yield (Carroll 1979) which integrated 
the economic and social objectives of business. The model was made practicable in the 
nineteen nineties following the establishment of concrete definitions for the various 
stakeholder groups involved in business activity (Lee 2008).  
Despite all this, the issue continues to be hotly debated. Antonio Tencati y Laszlo Zsolnai 
(Tencati and Zsolnai 2009: 369) comment that CSR is no more than another element of the 
traditional company model. It does not create neither any kind of moral commitment nor any 
profound change in the way business is analysed. It is taken to be one more tool available to 
improve corporate economic performance. They refer to M. E. Porter and M. R. Kramer 
(Porter and Kramer 2006) for whom the corporate offer can be improved by a socially 
responsible positioning. Tencati and Zsolnai are not attracted by such a proposition. Their 
perception is that CSR has been turned into an instrument exclusively focussed on 
maximising profits for shareholders and as such is prejudicial to the environment, today’s 
society, future generations and finally the businesses themselves. They believe that the 
strength and sustainability of a company rests on its ability to adapt to its environmental, 
social and cultural context. It is only through the creation of values by and for the benefit of 
all stakeholders that companies can involve them and achieve a profound support based 
around their commitment. 
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Means to Create Greater Investor Commitment 
As has been observed in the case of Cadbury, one of the major drawbacks of the limited 
liability company is the short-termism of shareholders who tend to speculate rather than 
invest. Directors of quoted companies are constrained in their management by the presence in 
the shareholders’ register of new members who are looking for quick profits. These members 
provoke instability because they seek a rapid revaluation of their shares arising from the 
volatility which derives from rumours about a possible takeover, a higher takeover offer, a 
sudden change in sales or production strategy, the substitution of existing directors for new 
more aggressive managers, or even the cancellation of long-term investment projects.  
The ownership of quoted companies is often decided by short-term shareholders. In the case 
of Cadbury Roger Carr, Chairman of the Board, explained in a speech in Oxford University 
on 9
th
 February 2010 that in the end it was the change in the shareholders’ register that lost 
the takeover battle against Kraft – the owners of the shares became progressively dominated 
by financial investors, interested only in quarterly results, in place of long-term 
administrators. In the final moments there were insufficient shareholders prepared to 
consider the long-term future of the company and sacrifice an immediate gain in favour of 
long-term prosperity…individuals who had controlled their shares during a few days or 
weeks decided the fate of a company that had been built up during the best part of 200 years 
(Mayer 2013: 92). 
For Colin Mayer a corporation is characterised by a diversity of commitments – to 
shareholders and to other stakeholders. However, shareholders are able to practice speculative 
dealing which forces directors to offer them an immediate reward. In many cases they achieve 
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such rewards by investing in hedge funds
9
 which buy shares in companies with the idea of 
control or acquisition, in both cases obliging directors to increase dividend payments. In this 
way, shareholders have an advantage over other participants in the business’s activities. They 
can take cash out of the company because they have voting rights over its future. By this 
means an investment fund can buy shares in a company subject to a takeover bid. By doing so 
it assumes no responsibility for the company’s operations nor any commitment to other 
participants. It can use the shares to vote in favour of the takeover and so achieve an 
immediate profit – a process which thus provides a means of diverting corporate profits in 
favour of one of the participants, the shareholder, at the expense of the others (Mayer 2013: 
185-186)  
One proposal to avoid such a diversion of profits would be to grant more independence to 
directors. However, this solution would create agency problems relating to the directors 
seeking personal gains in detriment to the corporation. Other more interesting proposals focus 
on differentiating investors in accordance with their degree of commitment. 
Currently any assessment of the commitment of shareholders is very difficult because there is 
no way for them to indicate their intentions regarding the time they expect to maintain 
ownership of their holdings. Hence those who wish to sell after a few days have the same 
voting rights on company decisions as those who wish to retain their holdings for a number of 
years. The first group bear the consequences of their voting decision during an insignificant 
period, and the second group during an extended period. But both groups exercise the same 
influence at the time of taking a decision that can affect the results of the company for many 
                                                          
9
 Hedge funds are investment funds originally conceived to protect investors by providing a means of making 
small investments, the results of which were expected to inversely reflect the market (hence insuring an 
investment portfolio in the face of market movements). In practice they are often used as instruments of financial 
speculation. 
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years. It is interesting to note in this context that, according to the German ex-banker Rainer 
Voss, two decades ago a share would be held by its owner for an average of a few days, 
whilst today the average length of ownership is twenty-two seconds (Voss 2013). 
Mayer proposes that shareholders should register the time period during which they intend to 
retain their shares and that they should receive voting rights corresponding to the time 
remaining up to disposal. Thus a share with ten years to go before maturity should have ten 
times the vote of one with only a year up to maturity. Those shareholders who do not wish to 
commit themselves to keeping their shares could maintain them outside the register and 
forego voting rights. In this way the company would be able to access short-term capital in 
the financial markets which would thereby continue to exercise a very important role in the 
fixing of share prices and the flow of information, but would be controlled by committed 
shareholders (Mayer 2013: 206-214).  
This proposal of a register would concede voting rights in proportion to the future 
commitment of shareholders and would restrict decisions concerning takeovers to 
shareholders committed to the future prosperity of the company in the long term. 
Conclusion 
Since its beginnings the institution of the limited liability company has been subject to debate. 
The limitation of shareholders’ responsibilities transfers business risks to other participants in 
the company’s activities such as suppliers, customers and workers. 
Limited liability’s main drawback relates to speculation in financial markets. The corporate 
form separates ownership from management, a fact which promotes diversification in 
investment portfolios by individuals who are not involved in the activities of the business nor 
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wish to be informed about those activities. The limitation applied to their liabilities is key to 
their sense of security in the face of investment risk. 
In this way acquiring shares in companies has been turned into a purely financial operation. 
Investors are motivated by short-term profit objectives and managers are ever more obliged to 
work towards goals which have little or nothing to do with the prosperity of the company in 
the long-term. 
The study of the history of limited liability and its impact on economic development is very 
important in order to evaluate not just the drawbacks but also the positive aspects of its 
invention. It has made rapid economic growth possible, facilitating the provision of capital for 
projects which would otherwise been delayed or considered to be unviable. Many authors not 
only praise these aspects of limited liability but consider that they form part of an 
evolutionary process, always positive, which will lead to ever more sophisticated forms of 
investment and which will bring greater economic success.  
Nevertheless, the objective of this article has been to point out failures in the corporation. An 
increasing number of texts support the need to find ways of achieving growth which seek the 
commitment of all the members of a company in equal measure. They invite a reflection on 
the drawbacks of a legal form which stresses the relationship between two participants 
(shareholders and managers) in detriment to all the others. 
The historical application of the concepts of multiple liability and Corporate Social 
Responsibility demonstrate the recognition by society of difficulties associated with the 
limited liability model; and recent proposals concerning the need to compensate the economic 
privileges that limited liability concedes to shareholders, by means of enforcing greater 
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commitment and voting rights proportional to that commitment, are worthy of serious 
reflection. 
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